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ABSTRACT 
Aim/Purpose Collaborative, interdisciplinary research is growing rapidly, but we still have 
limited and fragmented understanding of  what is arguably the heart of  such 
research—collaborative, interdisciplinary reasoning (CIR).  
Background This article integrates neo-Pragmatist theories of  reasoning with insights 
from literature on interdisciplinary research to develop a working definition 
of  collaborative, interdisciplinary reasoning. The article then applies this 
definition to an empirical example to demonstrate its utility. 
Methodology The empirical example is an excerpt from a Toolbox workshop transcript. 
The article reconstructs a cogent, inductive, interdisciplinary argument from 
the excerpt to show how CIR can proceed in an actual team. 
Contribution The study contributes operational definitions of  ‘reasoning together’ and 
‘collaborative, interdisciplinary reasoning’ to existing literature. It also 
demonstrates empirical methods for operationalizing these definitions, with 
the argument reconstruction providing a brief  case study in how teams rea-
son together. 
Findings 1. Collaborative, interdisciplinary reasoning is the attempted integration of  
disciplinary contributions to exchange, evaluate, and assert claims that 
enable shared understanding and eventually action in a local context. 
2. Pragma-dialectic argument reconstruction with conversation analysis is a 
method for observing such reasoning from a transcript. 
3. The example team developed a strong inductive argument to integrate 
their disciplinary contributions about modeling. 




1. Interdisciplinary work requires agreeing with teammates about what is 
assertible and why. 
2. To assert something together legitimately requires making a cogent, in-
tegrated argument. 
Recommendation  
for Researchers  
1. An argument is the basic unit of  analysis for interdisciplinary integra-
tion. 
2. To assess the argument’s cogency, it is helpful to reconstruct it using 
pragma-dialectic principles and conversation analysis tools.  
3. To assess the argument’s interdisciplinary integration and participant 
roles in the integration, it is helpful to graph the flow of  words as a 
Sankey chart from participant-disciplines to the argument conclusion. 
Future Research How does this definition of  CIR relate to other interdisciplinary ‘cognition’ 
or ‘learning’ type theories? How can practitioners and theorists tell the dif-
ference between true intersubjectivity and superficial agreeableness in these 
dialogues? What makes an instance of  CIR ‘good’ or ‘bad’? How does col-
laborative, transdisciplinary reasoning differ from CIR, if  at all? 




Collaborative, interdisciplinary research has grown dramatically in recent decades—both in preva-
lence as well as promise (Van Noorden, 2015). The National Academies recently reported that 90% 
of  scientific and engineering papers are now written by two or more authors (National Research 
Council, 2015, pp. 19-20), and many of  these teams are interdisciplinary. In six domains, papers from 
2005 referenced an average of  50% more disciplines than papers from 1975 (Porter & Rafols, 2009). 
The domains studied were (1) Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology; (2) Engineering, Electrical & 
Electronic; (3) Mathematics; (4) Medicine – Research & Experimental; (5) Neurosciences; and (6) 
Physics – Atomic, Molecular & Chemical). The trend towards interdisciplinary referencing practic-
es—and by implication, interdisciplinary reasoning among author teams—has been especially marked 
since the mid-1980s (Lariviere & Gingras, 2014). 
Rapid expansion in collaborative, interdisciplinary research has been justified by both the epistemic 
and instrumental promises of  this mode of  research (National Research Council, 2005). Epistemical-
ly, the claim is that many problems—especially so-called “grand challenges” (De Grandis & Efstathi-
ou, 2016) or “wicked problems” (Brown, Harris, & Russell, 2010; Rittel & Webber, 1973)—cannot be 
understood by a single discipline. Rather, insights are claimed to be more relevant and more incisive 
when knowledge is integrated across disciplinary boundaries and interstices (National Research 
Council, 2005, pp. 16-17). Instrumentally, it often ‘takes a village’ to access the material, human, tem-
poral, and technical resources needed to research such wicked problems (Hagstrom, 1964; Lewis, 
Ross, & Holden 2012). 
However advantageous, this form of  research poses its own challenges, which have in turn sparked 
meta-research on collaborative, interdisciplinary processes—a literature to which this study contrib-
utes (e.g., Frodeman, Klein, & Mitcham, 2010; Frodeman, Klein, & Pacheco, 2017). Meta-research 
and lessons learned in practice have together produced a plethora of  tools, frameworks, and con-
structs aimed to help us understand and address challenges inherent in cross-disciplinary teamwork 
(e.g., i2insights.org https://i2insights.org; National Institutes of Health National Cancer Institute, n.d.).   
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What has been underrated in this meta-research and practice, however, is a clear understanding of  
what could be considered the most basic task of  these research teams: collaborative, interdisciplinary 
reasoning. By reasoning, here, I mean making inferences from what we understand to what we don’t 
understand (Scriven, 1976). Making inferences entails exploring implications of  a claim, using some 
claims to justify or cast doubt on other claims. That is, reasoning assesses the “warranted assertibil-
ity” (Dewey, 1938, p. 9) of  a claim by evaluating the implications of  other, more well-established 
claims. 
Broadly speaking, we engage in reasoning when someone wants to assert an idea and others want to 
assess the right to assert it. These desires create different kinds of  discourse settings in which asser-
tions are made and defended. Sometimes, what is asserted is an answer to a question. These dis-
course settings constitute inquiries. Research is a type of  inquiry, and therefore reasoning is essential 
to it. Failing to understand this most essential activity results in limited progress in improving theory 
and practice of  collaborative, interdisciplinary research.  
This investigation contributes to filling the related conceptual gap by first proposing a definition of  
collaborative, interdisciplinary reasoning (CIR) based on the neo-Pragmatist reasoning and argumentation 
literature. Next follows an in-depth example of  CIR so understood to illustrate that this form of  rea-
soning in interdisciplinary teams is plausible. The paper concludes by reflecting on areas for future 
research. The tasks for future research include investigating situations in which reasoning goes poor-
ly. This paper presents the ideal for CIR as a goal for which to aim. However, an ideal—by defini-
tion—is never fully realized. A full, ethical, and useful treatment of  CIR must therefore consider 
non-ideal situations, providing conceptual frameworks and practical suggestions for engaging the real 
world. This paper provides an orienting direction for such future work. Future directions also include 
extension into collaborative, transdisciplinary reasoning. This paper focuses on interdisciplinary re-
search as the integration rather than transcendence of  disciplines, or as the incorporation of  academ-
ic and non-academic stakeholders. This is because there is more literature on interdisciplinarity than 
transdisciplinarity and because interdisciplinarity remains a common goal in the research world. This 
paper aims, therefore, to contribute to interdisciplinary work directly and to transdisciplinary work by 
extension or transfer. 
COLLABORATIVE, INTERDISCIPLINARY REASONING DEFINED 
REASONING TOGETHER DEFINED 
To reiterate, this article focuses upon reasoning that should occur among members of  an interdisci-
plinary research project. Research here distinguishes inquiries that are planned and conducted system-
atically from those conducted more haphazardly. More specifically, Leedy and Ormrod (2005, p. 2), 
state, “Research is a systematic process of  collecting, analyzing, and interpreting information (data) in 
order to increase our understanding of  the phenomenon about which we are interested or con-
cerned.” Research, in other words, is a type of  formal inquiry that seeks to increase understanding. In 
this conception, research occurs not only in academic settings but also in industrial and national la-
boratories, law enforcement offices, and non-profit organizations, to name a few places. Research 
projects might involve only one person, but the focus here is projects involving two or more collabo-
rators.  
CIR is a specific kind of  the more general activity of  reasoning together, requiring first an under-
standing of  that more general concept. Communication is the vehicle for collaborative reasoning. J. 
Britt Holbrook (2013) helpfully identified three ways to understand communication, particularly as it 
applies to interdisciplinary research. One view is the Kuhn-MacIntyre thesis that reasoning across 
perspectives is not possible, because perspectives amount to incommensurable paradigms. Any col-
laborative reasoning that does occur requires one of  the interlocutors to acquire “native fluency” in 
the relevant disciplinary languages, an accomplishment that is extremely difficult, rare, and in the end, 
not the integration of  two paradigms. A second view, the Bataille-Lyotard thesis, holds that collabo-
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rative reasoning can proceed only by inventing a new language, built expressly for that discourse. Like 
the Kuhn-MacIntyre thesis, the Bataille-Lyotard thesis contends that different perspectives amount to 
incommensurable paradigms. However, unlike its Kuhn-MacIntyre counterpart, this thesis argues 
that commensurability is possible—but only through the invention of  a custom-built language. A 
third major understanding of  reasoning together is the Habermas-Klein thesis, which holds that col-
laborative reasoning is possible through integration of  perspectives. While Holbrook’s article does not 
acknowledge this, other work from the Habermas-Klein perspective discusses many possible paths to 
integration (Klein, 1996; 2014a, pp. 20-22; O’Rourke, Crowley, & Gonnerman, 2016; Repko, Szostak, 
& Buchberger, 2016). Some paths may involve the creation of  a new language but others may inte-
grate existing languages. Moreover, although the Habermas-Klein thesis emphasizes integration as 
the ideal, the thesis acknowledges that in reality some perspectives are incommensurable (whether for 
inherent or contextual reasons is up for debate in each case). Thus, while Holbrook may disagree 
with me, I believe the Habermas-Klein thesis accommodates both the Bataille-Lyotard and Kuhn-
MacIntyre theses while also affirming what most of  us tend to believe: that reasoning together does 
happen across different perspectives.  
Therefore, for the purposes of  this project the Habermas-Klein thesis is most appropriate. I empha-
size one strand of  this thesis with a conception of  ‘reasoning together’ found in works by Jürgen 
Habermas (1985), Larry Wright (1995; 2001), and Christian Campolo (Campolo, 2005; Campolo & 
Turner, 2002). This approach differs from perspectives of  reasoning that have been more common 
in interdisciplinary literature, such as interdisciplinary learning (Augsburg & Chitewere, 2013), think-
ing (Dreyfuss, 2011), and cognition (Derry, Schunn, & Gernsbacher, 2013; Nikitina, 2005). The dif-
ference is that this neo-Pragmatist approach centers the social practice of  giving reasons through 
discourse for the sake of  coordinated action. It elevates the role of  communication as a learning-for-
doing tool while minimizing communication, learning, or doing treated separately: to neo-
Pragmatists, collaborative reasoning is cognitive and communicative and contextually practical all at 
once. With such a focus, new facets of  interdisciplinary communication come into the spotlight. As 
discussed and exemplified below, these new facets include types of  discourse, standards for assertion, 
argument structures (including premises and conclusions), and conversational moves. The article at-
tempts to show these are valuable insights. 
Habermas’s (1985) theory of  ‘reasoning together’ unfolds several types of  argumentation that differ 
based on differing goals of  discourse. Possible goals include finding truth (“theoretical discourse”), 
determining what is right action (“practical discourse”), establishing standards for value (“aesthetic 
criticism”), assessing authenticity of  expression (“artistic critique”), and—as a meta-purpose—
clarifying the appropriate forms of  the above discourses (“explicative discourse”) (Habermas, 1985, 
p. 23). Regarding the last goal, we need such meta-discourse because we always risk reasoning about 
different types of  things in inappropriate ways, e.g., confusing the way things are (finding truth) with 
the way things should be (determining what is right action, or establishing standards of  value). Expli-
cative discourse is especially important in interdisciplinary contexts as disciplines disagree about the 
appropriate way(s) to discuss many topics (Eigenbrode et al., 2007); indeed the interdisciplinary ex-
ample analyzed below illustrates explicative discourse. 
Habermas (1985) emphasizes that rational discourse toward the above goals always involves argu-
mentation because rational discourse depends upon one’s ability to evaluate reasons and inferences 
against shared (“transsubjective”) standards of  adequacy (p. 9). Such discourse can be understood as 
reasoning together, both because the claims and reasons are given in social contexts and because the 
standards by which those reasons are evaluated are socially constructed.  
Intersubjective standards, as Wright and Campolo call them, are statements whose meaning is shared 
between interlocutors and is used to judge the acceptability of  claims. For example, a common inter-
subjective standard in quantitative research is that statistical inferences must have a p value below 0.05 
to be considered credible (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, 
often require credible findings to be member checked (i.e., given approval by the respondents them-
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selves) (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Both of  these standards are socially constructed by epistemic com-
munities. These standards can therefore change. Moreover, these standards can have different mean-
ings, even to members within the same epistemic community or the same person in two different 
contexts. For example, 0.05 is the threshold for which statistical test? With what kind of  data? Simi-
larly, member checking must include which members? And how should the check be performed? 
These questions identify key features of  the meaning of  each standard. Intersubjectivity of  these 
standards requires participants agree upon the answers to such key questions. The best test we have 
of  agreement is the ability to coordinate actions that depend upon the meaning. For example, if  I ask 
for the data so I can test for significance, and if  you give me the data in the form I expect, then I can 
be fairly confident you and I have the same test in mind and therefore a shared meaning of  “statisti-
cal significance.” Intersubjectivity, therefore, is best evidenced in localized social exchanges where 
actions serve as evidence of  agreement across subjects. 
It is important to note that Habermas’s (1985) conception of  rational discourse includes both “lin-
guistic and non-linguistic actions,” where non-linguistic expressions might include “delays, surgical 
interventions, declarations [waging] of  war, [and] repairs” (p. 8). Both linguistic and non-linguistic 
expressions communicate, but only linguistic expressions use words to do so. What matters is that 
the expression effectively makes a claim addressing one of  the purposes listed above, and that this 
claim can be evaluated against shared standards of  reasoning. 
For examples of  the kinds of  discourse Habermas (1985) discusses, consider the following pair of  
climate change discourses. To set context, imagine a city has adopted a climate change adaptation 
plan that involves spending $12 million to raise the elevation of  causeways in and out of  town. The 
action of  causeway renovation is a non-linguistic claim approximately translated linguistically as, “We 
believe climate change is real and that this is a right way to deal with it.” This statement prompts two 
different kinds of  discourse in local meetings, coffee shops, and newspapers. First is the “theoretical” 
or truth-finding question, “Is climate change really real?” Second is the practical question, “If  it is 
real, what is the right way to deal with it?” These two questions have different assertion goals and 
therefore require distinct forms of  reasoning. What shapes those distinct forms ought to take would 
be decided in an “explicative” discourse about each question that clarifies their appropriate form. In 
all cases, for these discourses to count as discourses, multiple parties must participate, and participa-
tion requires their ability to evaluate each other’s claims. As Habermas observes, “[My] reflections 
point in the direction of  basing the rationality of  an expression on its being susceptible of  criticism 
and grounding” (p. 9).  
Expanding on Habermas’s (1985) insights, Wright (1995) and Campolo (2005) theorize that ‘reason-
ing together’ is the activity of  establishing or repairing intersubjectivity about the implications of  a 
claim for the sake of  continuing a shared effort. Or, as Campolo puts it, “It is a way of  restoring or 
initiating purposeful coordination to our several actions or behaviors” (p. 38). Purposeful coordina-
tion is exactly what is at stake in collaborative projects; without it, a group is unlikely to accomplish 
its goals. Examples of  coordinated action include meeting together, defining a research question, 
collecting and analyzing data, and submitting an article.  
Here’s how reasoning together supports such coordinated action. The initial result of  a session of  
reasoning together is an assertion, which is a type of  action (“communicative action,” according to 
Habermas, 1985). This initial action then enables a chain of  other actions: assertions enable under-
standing, understanding enables belief, and belief  enables actions (see bottom half  of  Figure 1). This 
chain must occur for each of  the innumerable decisions an interdisciplinary team must make. Moreo-
ver, the project itself  is the first link in this chain as the understanding it generates should go onto 
influence beliefs and actions beyond the project. 
Collaborative reasoning in research can be triggered by a disruption in any one of  these links in the 
chain of  action—originating either within or beyond the project. John Dewey (1910) called such a 
break “the feeling of  a discrepancy, or difficulty” (p. 73), and it is the first step in an inquiry. An ex-
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ample of  disruption within the team might come when teammates do not agree on how to complete 
the data analysis, or when someone doesn’t understand what someone else wrote in the manuscript 
so they can’t approve its submission. Disruptions beyond the team might arise even before the team 
assembles; these might be disruptions that start the team’s entire project as an inquiry into an exter-
nal disruption. For instance, when colleagues in a field no longer understand a phenomenon (e.g., the 
claims are controversial, incoherent, or absent), the coordinated action of  understanding has been 
disrupted, and this event can manifest as a research question. In another instance, resource users 
might be at a loss about what to do because they are questioning some long-held beliefs (e.g., they 
question if  climate is stable), and, if  researchers are listening to their needs, this disruption in daily 
life might prompt a research question. Research projects are attempts to restore disrupted chains of  
action in the world (including disrupted understanding, such as curiosity) by answering research ques-
tions, and this requires answering many other kinds of  questions within the team’s work. Answering 
questions as a team requires reasoning together. 
 
Figure 1: Reasoning together in any local context (top) vs.  
collaborative, interdisciplinary contexts (bottom). 
Integrating the insights of  Habermas, Wright, and Campolo, in the present project I understand rea-
soning together as follows: 
Reasoning together is (linguistic or non-linguistic) discourse in which the participants exchange, 
evaluate, and assert claims that enable coordinated action in a local context.  
This proposition is worth unpacking. Recall that reasoning involves assessing one claim’s dependence 
on other, more well-established claims. To evaluate these claims, participants must agree upon the 
standards by which they will evaluate them. The following questions arise: What counts as a “sup-
portive” claim? How do we judge when one claim legitimately “depends on” another? What do we 
accept as “well-established”? If  members of  a team are not yet on the same page about these stand-
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ards, they need to resolve their misunderstandings using a meta-, “explicative” discourse. Otherwise, 
they might go ahead and apply a shared or dominant standard in any of  Habermas’s four other 
forms of  discourse.  
Therefore, in order to exchange, evaluate, and assert claims together, participants need shared stand-
ards of  what counts as good reasons and inferences. Well-supported, shared inferences then enable 
coordinated action. An expanded definition of  reasoning together, therefore, follows: 
Reasoning together is the co-application and, perhaps, co-revision or even co-creation of  inter-
subjective standards for what counts as a good reasons and inferences in a localized social ex-
change so that people can continue working together.  
The prefix “co-” specifies that these activities occur collaboratively, through conversation and other 
forms of  communication. Co-application consists of  applying existing standards of  reasoning. For 
instance, a team may have already decided that ‘good’ claims in their project must be based at least 
partly on inferential statistics. They could then apply that standard to a questionable claim to see how 
good it is. Co-revision modifies an existing standard to restore shared understanding of  it. Co-
creation, however, is the synthesis of  a new standard from existing, shared understanding. Note that 
reasoning together cannot create shared understanding ex nihilo; much must already be shared (Cam-
polo, 2005).  
This conception of  ‘reasoning together’ emphasizes (1) team members must have shared resources 
for evaluating a claim and (2) the goal of  reasoning depends on the local context of  a targeted action. 
Participants in collaborative research are trying to take an action of  assertion that leads to the subse-
quent action of  shared understanding, whether understanding of  truth, action, value, authentic expres-
sion, or discourse itself. This shared understanding, ideally, enables further coordinated actions be-
yond the research project, e.g., spending $12 million to upgrade causeways.  
To clarify relationships among key concepts thus far: We reason to go from understanding less to 
understanding more by making inferences. We make inferences by evaluating whether some relatively 
well-established claims support other claims. Evaluating support involves applying standards for what 
counts as support, where applying such standards may first require creating or revising them. When 
reasoning as a team, all participants must agree upon and understand those standards. Reasoning 
then results in warranted, assertible conclusions that enable a series of  coordinated actions. Assertion 
itself  is a kind of  coordinated communicative action, but it typically serves a more distal action. In a 
surgery team, that action is a successful surgery. In a research team, that action is shared understand-
ing of  a phenomenon. Eventually, shared understanding from research may influence actions beyond 
the research project, such as a more successful surgery. The top half  of  Figure 1 charts this definition 
of  ‘reasoning together.’ 
COLLABORATIVE, INTERDISCIPLINARY REASONING DEFINED 
From here, to define CIR we need only specify what it means to reason together in an interdiscipli-
nary way. Given the prevalence and promise of  interdisciplinary research described above, a relatively 
clear consensus has emerged about what it means to be “interdisciplinary.” The authoritative defini-
tion from the National Academies in their 2005 report (National Research Council, 2005) Facilitating 
Interdisciplinary Research is widely recognized: interdisciplinarity entails “integrat[ing] information, data, 
techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of  
specialized knowledge” (p. 2). Combining this definition with the above definition of  ‘reasoning to-
gether’ suggests the following definition of  CIR: 
Collaborative, interdisciplinary reasoning is the attempted integration of  disciplinary contribu-
tions to co-apply, co-revise, or co-create intersubjective standards for what counts as good rea-
sons and inferences in a local social exchange so that people can gain understanding and then 
continue working together. 
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Or, a shorter way to express the same concept: 
CIR is the attempted integration of  disciplinary contributions to exchange, evaluate, and assert 
claims that enable shared understanding and eventually action in a local context. 
The bottom half  of  Figure 1 shows how this definition of  CIR specifies the more general definition 
of  ‘reasoning together.’ 
Standards for reasoning already exist in most disciplinary discourses, but they must often be revised 
or created in interdisciplinary discourses because all disciplinarians bring their own standards to the 
team (Cetina, 2009; Eigenbrode et al., 2007). Disciplinary standards may not only have different 
thresholds (e.g., p < 0.1 versus 0.05), they may also have different content and meanings altogether 
(e.g., “significant” = relevant, credible, actionable; versus p < 0.05). Co-revision consists in sorting 
out mismatched understandings of  standards, while co-creation consists in establishing new stand-
ards. Some teams may be able to co-apply an intersubjective standard right away—perhaps having 
worked together before. Usually, however, teams will first need to co-revise or co-create such a 
standard through the process of  explicative discourse. 
As Habermas (1985) observed, a discourse that makes claims can be understood as an argument, 
where the more established claims are premises and the inferred claim is the conclusion. A reasoning 
team is trying to craft a cogent argument all of  its members endorse. The argument contains premis-
es each interlocutor can evaluate for “allegations of  support” of  the conclusion (Wright, 1995, p. 
570), and the conclusion captures the result of  co-applying the standard to those premises. In some 
cases, the conclusion will itself  be a standard to co-apply in another argument. In such cases, as an 
instance of  explicative discourse, the argument is co-repairing or co-creating a shared standard for 
later reasoning. For example, the city council that approved the causeway renovation probably had an 
earlier meeting or series of  meetings in which they decided that conclusions about climate change 
and what to do about it require certain kinds of  evidence (e.g., regional climate models, climate risk 
assessment). Therefore, when they got this evidence, they were able to make an argument asserting 
climate change is real and causeway renovation is an appropriate next step. In an interdisciplinary 
group (perhaps the city council qualifies), the argument premises will often be crafted from various 
disciplinary contributions. The example in the next section illustrates how collaborative, interdiscipli-
nary conversations can be understood as instances of  CIR. It focuses specifically on explicative dis-
course—the co-creation of  standards for group reasoning about another topic.  
First, though, it is crucial to emphasize that interlocutors need not succeed in achieving intersubjec-
tivity to engage in CIR. All three philosophers above emphasize, as Wright (1995) observes, “The 
practice of  giving reasons is of  value in our deliberations when and because we are equipped [emphasis 
added] to evaluate the allegation of  support [of  a reason]” (p. 570). When we are not so equipped, 
reasons don’t help much. In other words, it is quite possible to give reasons in a way that is not valua-
ble and nevertheless be engaged in reasoning together. We often reason together quite poorly. Defin-
ing exactly what it means to reason together well or poorly in CIR remains a future project, but some 
warnings about the general process of  reasoning together apply. 
Wright (1995) and Campolo (2005; Campolo & Turner, 2002) stress that we are equipped to evaluate 
allegations of  support when the standards by which we evaluate them are (in my paraphrasing) (a) 
shared, (b) relevant, and (c) informed. If  any one of  these three criteria is absent, then we ought not 
to reason together. Here’s why. 
There are two options when participants realize they do not share enough foundational, relevant, 
informed commitments to make reliable inferences that solve the problem. One option is to stop 
reasoning and try another coordination approach, such as following orders. The other option is to 
continue reasoning, but this option is dangerous. To continue reasoning using claims they do not 
hold or understand, participants must create an appearance of  informed consensus. This illusion can 
be constructed in at least two ways: either stronger participants force weaker participants to adopt 
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their views and/or participants feign understanding. In the first case, great harm might be done 
through epistemic oppression and valuable understanding might be suppressed that could have 
helped solve the problem (Dotson, 2012; 2014). In the second case, which might also be a form of  
testimonial injustice (Dotson, 2011), it is unlikely the group will solve the problem and this could be 
harmful in itself. In addition, any success participants might have will be due to luck—good infer-
ences will have nothing to do with it. This can also be harmful as it may reinforce bad reasoning hab-
its (Campolo, 2005).  
Collaborators must therefore have quite a bit in common before reasoning together becomes possi-
ble or useful. While it is possible to have an explicative discourse, i.e., to reason together to co-create 
a shared standard for another discourse, it is not possible to have explicative discourses about expli-
cative discourses ad infinitum. We must, eventually, agree on some standard for reasoning to get off  
the ground. These basic shared standards arise from our shared experiences; for instance, our experi-
ence as academics. As Campolo (2005) puts it,  
Reasoning together in a fruitful way depends upon our existing shared practice, shared 
knowledge, and shared competence. Under the right conditions, reasoning together can re-
store that intersubjectivity. Under almost no circumstances can reasoning together create that 
intersubjectivity where it does not already exist. (p. 45). 
Thus, to judge whether a group is reasoning well or poorly, we must know the nature of  their shared 
background. Therefore, the example below goes so far as to affirm reasoning did succeed to some 
extent, but a full evaluation is beyond the scope of  this study. 
COLLABORATIVE, INTERDISCIPLINARY REASONING 
EXEMPLIFIED 
CIR can be found in many places. The Appendix documents an excerpt from a transcript of  a 
Toolbox workshop as well as the analysis I performed on the transcript, described below. Toolbox 
workshops host lightly facilitated, cross-disciplinary team discussions about project-related work. The 
facilitator rarely speaks, but the written instrument each participant completes provides some struc-
ture in the form of  a menu of  project-related assumptions participants can discuss at will. (For more 
information about the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, formerly known as the “Toolbox Project”, see 
O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013). The excerpt in the Appendix is a conversation thread about 40 speaking 
turns long, including minor interruptions and affirmations such as “Mmmhmm,” and “Right” ex-
cluded from this analysis. In this thread, interlocutors discuss what counts as modeling in their inter-
disciplinary project. They evaluate and integrate each other’s claims into a coherent argument sup-
porting a conclusion about modeling that allows them to go on together. Of  the twelve team mem-
bers present, only three participate in this thread: a sociologist, a hydrologist, and an engineer. They 
integrate contributions from their three disciplines into five argument premises (P1-5) that together 
support a single conclusion about what counts as modeling in their project.  
This section begins by overviewing the argument. Next, it describes the methods used in reconstruct-
ing the argument and then the reconstruction itself, i.e., how each premise is developed in the dia-
logue. Lastly, the section concludes by showing how this example of  explicative discourse enables 
future coordinated action for the participants. This section is an example other analysts can follow 
with interdisciplinary conversations wherever they occur. 
ARGUMENT OVERVIEW 
The numbers in parentheses below after a given premise refer to speaking turns that contribute to 
that premise. The first premise is mostly implicit in the dialogue, which is indicated by brackets. 
(Noteworthy: the sociologist does utter a few words gesturing in this direction). Similarly, the conclu-
sion does not appear in any speaking turns because no one spoke the entire conclusion out loud; it 
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also appears in brackets. However, implicit conclusions are not necessarily unreasonable or problem-
atic. Explicit articulation is not logically required since the conclusion follows from the premises, 
which were already well-established, and it summarizes the general position that participants in the 
excerpt constructed. 
P1.  [The practices of  the people here decide what modeling is in our project.] (64, 66) 
P2.  Everyone here uses statistics with empirical observations to build their models. (66, 68, 69, 
79, 89, 91) 
P3.  Hydrologists and engineers use statistics to correlate inputs and outputs according to pro-
cesses they already know. (70, 75-79, 83, 85, 87) 
P4.  Sociologists use statistics to discover processes. (70, 77, 81, 85, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100) 
P5.  These two practices both use the input-process-output framework although their operation-
alizations of  the framework differ. (72, 74, 88, 91, 103, 104) 
C.   [Therefore, modeling in our project involves using statistics with empirical observations to 
operationalize the input-process-output concept.]  
With this conclusion, conversational participants are now on the same page about what modeling is 
in their project, enabling them to continue modeling together. Because their modeling practice was at 
stake, interrupted by misunderstanding, they co-revised their standard for what counts as a reasona-
ble claim about modeling. Now, they could co-apply this standard to their shared modeling practices 
in future interdisciplinary dialogues—until another disruption requires them to co-revise. Their con-
clusion is an inference that allowed them to go from understanding less about modeling to under-
standing more. It is an assertion that enables future chains of  coordinated action. 
ARGUMENT RECONSTRUCTION METHODS 
Reconstructing arguments from ordinary language—especially un-rehearsed dialogues—is difficult 
and controversial. Pragma-dialectical argumentation scholars recognize the tension between getting 
the reconstruction right while also assuming the speakers are making the strongest argument possi-
ble, consistent with their argumentative intentions (van Eemeren, Garssen, Krabbe, Henkemans, et 
al., 2014a). This assumption requires an analyst to fit the speakers’ words into a cogent argument 
form—even if  it is not the form in which the speaker presented claims. Indeed, everyday conversa-
tions rarely proceed as linear arguments. In most cases, one must give the speaker the benefit of  the 
doubt when it comes to re-constructing a cogent argument but also capture the conversational moves 
actually used to argue. That is, the analyst must be charitable but also descriptively accurate. There is 
no easy to way to resolve the tension between accuracy and charity, although pragma-dialectical 
(schematic) reconstructions combined with conversation analysis can help, and that is what I have 
tried to do here (Sandvik, 1997). Nevertheless, we can think of  argument reconstruction as more of  
an art than a science. Others may see a different argument in the excerpt than the one I present be-
low.  
However, any such disagreement merely illustrates the proposition that reasoning together is about 
exchanging and evaluating reasons for one’s assertions. Specifically, some might give reasons to disa-
gree with the reconstruction, underscoring that we rely upon reason-giving in research discourse and 
this difficult task requires balancing accurate and charitable interpretations of  what others have said. 
Thus, the main purpose of  this example is not to get the reconstruction “objectively right” (if  there 
is such a thing). The purpose, rather, is to illustrate collaborative, interdisciplinary reasoning, whether 
through the example itself  and/or how we talk about it.  
In this reconstruction the following guiding principles apply.  
1. The definition of  CIR identifies four nodes or knots in the reasoning tapestry: discussants, 




2. Brief  verbal affirmations such as “Mmmhmm,” and “Right” are not content contributions 
but rather indicate acceptance, and so they are excluded from the analysis. 
3. The remaining, substantive speaking turns may contain more than one distinct idea. 
4. Each distinct idea is coded as a separate “contribution.” 
5. The speaker’s own disciplinary identity indicates which disciplinary perspective is driving the 
contribution, unless the speaker explicitly notes they are taking on the perspective of  another 
discipline or disciplinarian. 
6. These disciplinary contributions contribute to argument premises, and the premises a con-
clusion.  
7. The premises and conclusion are assumed to be grammatically complete, contextually mean-
ingful, and logically coherent (i.e., “well-formed”) claims.  
8. A well-formed claim may or may not be spoken aloud. In cases where it is not, the analyst 
supplies the missing pieces by surmising what the speakers intended to say or believe they 
did say. Listening to the audio recording can help in resolving ambiguity. 
The full application of  these principles to the excerpt is documented in the Appendix. 
ARGUMENT RECONSTRUCTION 
P1. [The practices of  the people here decide what modeling is in our project.] 
Understanding the origin of  Premise 1 requires first looking at the dialogue’s context. Participants 
requested a Toolbox workshop because they wanted to get on the same page about key concepts in 
their project. Thus, this excerpt about modeling takes place in a conversational context designed to 
help them increase mutual understanding, which includes mutual understanding about what modeling 
is in their project. The assumption behind the dialogue is that the people present have a significant 
role to play in determining how things are understood within their project. In fact, the sociologist 
implies as much when he opens the excerpted dialogue: 
Sociologist (64, 66): “Well one of  the things I found working with many of  the people in the 
room is a term I’m still trying to wrap my mind around, that I don’t think we all use the same 
way is the word ‘modeling’…We actually confronted this one when we tried to write our grant.” 
The sociologist references use of  the term “modeling” in their proposal writing process, indicating 
that the following discussion is about use of  the term in this project by people participating in the 
project. The others take up this conversation, below, implying they agree with this first premise.  
What has happened is that the participants immediately applied a shared, unspoken standard about 
what is assertible by the sociologist. What is assertible seems to be whatever has been experienced by 
anyone in the group—individually or collectively. It is not clear how they came to share this asserti-
bility standard. They may have affirmed the validity of  each other’s experiences in previous discus-
sions, or they may simply share that assumption based on their shared lifeworld as academics, where 
(usually) one’s expertise is not questioned by those from other disciplines. When applying this stand-
ard to his claim, the sociologist here is not speaking as a sociologist but more generally as a member 
of  the project. Indeed, Figure 2 shows P1 is comes from no particular disciplinary perspective. 
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Figure 2: Flow of  words (and therefore reasons) from speakers to disciplines, premises, and 
conclusion in the dialogue excerpt (26 speaking turns, 34 contributions, 1294 words).  
The width of  the link represents the number of  words. 
P2. Everyone here uses statistics with empirical observations to build their models. 
Premise 2 takes quite a while to become a full thought in the dialogue. Not until speaking turn 89 do 
participants discover what exactly they all have in common when modeling. They spend much of  the 
dialogue trying to find the commonality by showing how they use terms related to modeling, such as 
“calibration” and “significance.” For example, the Sociologist explains that when he models, 
Sociologist (66): … we [Sociologists] go and do a fairly standardized set of  mathematical type 
things that say, ok that is, that explains this much of  what we were trying to explain, this well or 
with this much degree of  confidence…. 
Sociologist (68): [cont.] Um, but you’re actually inferring sort of  this significance of  relationships 
and so.  
Hydrologist (69): [overlap] Well you just described what we do. 
In this brief  exchange, the hydrologist and sociologist agree that for them, significance means math-
ematically significant, a definition that likely refers to statistics given the use of  the terms “degree of  
confidence” and “significant.” The engineer never disagrees with this conclusion, suggesting that it 
also describes his practice. A longer exchange (75-89) centers on the term “calibration,” but in fact 
the process of  calibration is so technical they cannot fully compare the various meanings-in-practice 
during this brief  dialogue. They are satisfied to know calibration eventually ends by determining the 
statistical significance of  their empirical observations. 
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By comparing and contrasting related terms such as “calibration” and “significance,” the interlocu-
tors (the sociologist, hydrologist, and engineer) can triangulate on where the focus term, “modeling,” 
fits in their respective meaning structures (Mohr, 1998). In locating the target term in relation to oth-
er terms, they can discern its core meaning: they examine which terms it is related to in the same way 
in the meaning structures of  all participants. They decide that the core feature of  modeling for them 
is use of  statistics with empirical observations.  
Sociologist (66): “[The way] we model in the social sciences – some of  us do – is basically an ex-
ercise of  developing some theoretical models and testing them against the world and seeing how 
well that model fits.” 
Hydrologist (89): “But what you described is what you do for a model anyway, you’re approach 
to modeling? I’m just sitting here going, hmmm yep.” 
Again, we see the participants applying their shared standard for what is assertible, namely whatever 
has been experienced by the participants. When they apply this standard to the anecdotes given by 
the sociologist and hydrologist, they establish a new claim about the necessary role of  statistics. Now 
that they know what they have in common, they must articulate their differences to develop an inte-
grative definition of  modeling. Figure 2 shows P2 is an interdisciplinary premise, established by soci-
ology, hydrology, and a general perspective integrated into a coherent claim. 
P3. Hydrologists and engineers use statistics to correlate inputs and outputs 
according to processes they already know. 
Premises 3 and 4 take even longer than Premise 2 to formulate. In fact, not until the engineer intro-
duces the boundary-crossing metaphor of  a “box” do the sociologist and hydrologist/engineering 
camps articulate their practices in a shared language or terminology so they can compare them.  
Engineer (72): “I think one aspect of  it is, there’s like, think about it as a box. There’s inputs, and 
there’s outputs. One type of  model is trying to correlate those and show how inputs match with 
the outputs just however mathematically or statistical description. The other type is processes.” 
Most modelers are aware of  the box metaphor. It provides a common framework within which are 
different components—inputs, processes, and outputs (the IPO framework)—with different roles for 
different modelers. Still, interlocutors in this example struggle for a while to locate each other within 
this framework. Applying their “whatever we’ve experienced” standard is not as easy as it was in the 
first two premises. The difficulty seems to stem from the fact that, in contrast to their common use 
of  statistics, they either don’t use the IPO framework to understand their own modeling practices or, 
if  they do, they use it differently from each other. Reconciling those different uses takes some con-
versational work. 
Taking up the engineer’s “box” proposal, the hydrologist leans into the IPO framework to describe 
her modeling practice in detail in speaking turns 75 and 77. She ends with a provocative summary, 
“We [hydrologists] have some fundamental processes we know occur.” The sociologist immediately 
understands and critiques this sort of  modeling, signaling that this approach is somehow essential to 
the differences between sociological and hydrological IPO modeling; premises 3 and 4 co-evolve. 
The engineer identified two ways to use the IPO framework: (1) correlating inputs and outputs, and 
(2) specifying the processes. Once it becomes clear the sociologist does the latter, it is simultaneously 
clear the hydrologist and engineer do the former. Hence the fullness of  Premise 3 depends conversa-
tionally but not logically upon Premise 4. Figure 2 shows P3 is also an interdisciplinary premise, es-
tablished by the same contributing perspectives as P2, but from different utterances. The figure also 
shows that P3 takes the most words and therefore the longest to establish; it proved to be the tricki-
est premise for everyone to understand. This makes sense since P3 initiated P4 yet also depends con-
versationally upon it. 
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P4. Sociologists use statistics to discover processes. 
Because Premises 3 and 4 unfold simultaneously, it is worth requoting the hydrologist’s summary 
from speaking turn 77 more completely: 
Hydrologist (77): “[You sociologists are] trying to – your conceptual knowledge is trying to get 
put together somehow. We [hydrologists] have some fundamental processes we know occur [in 
the world], so we have to figure out whether or not we’re missing some [in this model].” 
This comment distinguishing the two modeling practices makes more sense later in the dialogue, af-
ter discussing the particular practice of  calibration: 
Sociologist (92): “We [sociologists] just don’t start with any process relationships, those are all to 
be discovered.” 
That is, if  hydrologists and engineers are correlating inputs and outputs because they already know (a 
potential list of) the processes involved, then what is different is that sociologists do not yet know 
their processes. One can see how this integrated understanding of  modeling would serve their pro-
ject very well because the disciplinary practices complement each other. Figure 2 shows P4 is actually 
a disciplinary claim from sociology; the sociologist is, after all, speaking for himself. However, we 
know he is responding to hydrological and engineering perspectives, so again we see that P4 depends 
conversationally but not logically upon P3. P4 therefore takes almost as many words as P3 to estab-
lish. Applying the “whatever we’ve experienced” standard to this claim takes as much effort as that 
for the previous claim. 
P5. These two practices both use the input-process-output framework although their 
operationalizations of  the framework differ. 
Finally, now that participants have identified their common use of  empirical statistics and their dif-
ferent roles in the IPO framework, they need to show how the commonality and the difference are 
both part of  the same practice, namely modeling. This is a bit of  a conversational formality as they 
have been assuming all along that these practices are part of  modeling. But they are not satisfied until 
they explicate exactly how those practices relate. Near the end, the hydrologist has an epiphany that 
brings it all together: 
Hydrologist (103): “Hey! So maybe it’s just that we all come up with conceptual models similarly, 
but it’s [the difference is] the actual implementation of  it?” 
Sociologist (104): “Seems to be. It’s yeah the practice of  what we actually do when say we go out 
and model.” 
The epiphany rests on the realization that the IPO framework is a conceptual model shared by both 
camps; everyone is assuming there are inputs, processes, and outputs in their models. However, when 
it comes time to build a model—to operationalize it—participants make different assumptions about 
what inputs, processes, and outputs to include. This is another application of  the “whatever we’ve 
experienced” standard. In their experience, hydrologists and engineers (in this dialogue) assume they 
know what processes could be involved, so what is to be discovered through the model is to what 
extent the inputs and outputs correlate based on which processes are actually involved and what val-
ues their parameters have. Sociologists, on the other hand, do not assume they know which processes 
could be involved; “those are all to be discovered.” In this way, both camps model using the IPO 
concept although they operationalize it in two different ways—but always with statistics! Figure 2 
shows P5 is also integrative, established by the engineering and general perspectives present. 
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C. [Therefore, modeling in our project involves using statistics with empirical 
observations to operationalize the input-process-output concept.] 
The argument’s conclusion follows logically and immediately from its five premises; essentially, par-
ticipants have already reached this conclusion after expositing premise 5. The conclusion is a general-
ization from two kinds of  modeling to all modeling that occurs or will occur in the project. Specifi-
cally, this takes the form of  an inductive argument, also known as an inductive generalization. Such 
an argument establishes that certain features shared by a sample of  members of  a set are likely 
shared by all members of  that set. Just how likely this prospect is depends upon how representative 
the sample is of  the set. In this case, our discussants believe they are remembering past instances of  
their modeling practices that accurately represent the types of  modeling they will do in the future. 
This is what justifies their application of  the “whatever we’ve experienced is assertible” standard. 
Time will tell how accurate this belief  is, but for now they have good reasons to believe their memo-
ries accurately reflect the past and predict the future. Therefore, this inductive argument yields a 
strong, cogent, interdisciplinary conclusion that allows them to move forward with modeling. Figure 
2 shows that all five premises, and therefore the total volume of  words spoken in the exchange, con-
tribute to the conclusion. Because these premises were established by several disciplines, and because 
we know the premises and conclusion are cogent, Figure 2 shows us that interdisciplinary integration 
resulted in the conclusion discussed above.  
This conclusion (of  an explicative discourse) functions as a standard they can apply in future forms 
of  discourse. It is a standard that was co-created from the application of  another standard that was 
already shared. If  participants did not already share that standard, they would not have been able to 
have this conversation. In other words, instances of  CIR depend upon shared, intersubjective stand-
ards that must pre-exist the focal question. Such pre-existing standards can be established through 
other rounds of  CIR or shared lifeworld experiences that create shared assumptions. 
ARGUMENT VISUALIZATION 
Visual analysis complements argument reconstruction. Argument reconstruction highlights the logi-
cal structure and rhetorical presentation of  the discourse. In doing so, it de-emphasizes the amount 
of  conversation that occurs, the overall sources and locations of  integration, and who plays particular 
roles across the entire argument. A parallel sets chart, on the other hand, emphasizes those very 
things (Figure 2). A parallel sets chart illustrates flows between sets, e.g., visualizing the flow of  mon-
ey through accounts or energy through trophic levels. (For the basics of  parallel sets charts, see 
https://datavizcatalogue.com/methods/parallel_sets.html. Sometimes these are also called Sankey 
diagrams, e.g., https://developers.google.com/chart/interactive/docs/gallery/sankey.)  
In our case, we are tracking the reasoning process from individual participants to a shared conclu-
sion. The “sets” are sources and sites of  inference along the way, viz., (1) participants, (2) disciplines, 
(3) premises, and (4) argument conclusion. (Participants are separate from disciplines since partici-
pants can infer the perspective of  several disciplines.) The “flow” is the reasons asserted, viz., words 
uttered. By tracking the words through the reasoning process, we can visualize sources and sites of  
integration and participant reasoning roles in the entire conversation at a glance. These quantitative 
insights complement the qualitative argument reconstruction, helping analysts and practitioners iden-
tify which disciplines tend to make certain kinds of  contributions to the integrative work, and who 
tends to represent those disciplines in what ways. 
While not the only way to visualize reasoning, this set-and-flow chart falls directly out of  the defini-
tion of  CIR given above. In that definition, CIR is the transformation of  disciplinary contributions 
into an interdisciplinary conclusion through the exchange of  reasons. In this example, words flow 
from participants, pictured on the left side of  the chart (Figure 2), through various disciplines and 
premises to the conclusion, on the right side. The word flows represent the exchange, evaluation, and 
assertion of  claims between participant-disciplines (inputs), coherent premises (process), and a con-
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clusion or warranted assertion (output), per the IPO model of  integration offered by O’Rourke and 
colleagues (O’Rourke et al., 2016).  
Note that the chart alone does not visualize integration or intersubjectivity; those must be assessed 
through the argument reconstruction. To wit, just because two disciplinary contributions are relevant 
to the same premise does not necessarily mean they are integrated beyond a mere, multidisciplinary 
‘stapling together.’ We must examine the construction of  the premise to assess its integration. Like-
wise, just because two people contribute to two disciplines which contribute to a single premise does 
not necessarily mean the people each understand that premise in the same way. We must carefully read 
the transcript. Integration and intersubjectivity are qualities of  the exchange, not quantities that can be 
charted. We can only locate integration and intersubjectivity in the chart if  we use our qualitative 
knowledge of  what the chart represents. 
While we cannot use the chart without the argument reconstruction, the argument reconstruction 
can stand alone as evidence of  CIR. However, because it pictures the entire exchange at once, the 
chart does make some dynamics of  CIR more visible than in the reconstruction alone.  
Figure 2 helps us identify disciplinary sources of  integration and participant reasoning roles. We see 
the conversation takes 1294 words, which is not very many, so we must keep that in mind when in-
terpreting the chart. The colors in Figure 2 identify the originating nodes; therefore each node has a 
unique color. (Remember that participants are distinct from disciplines, so the sociologist has a dif-
ferent color from sociology). This helps us track who or what is contributing to a given node. 
Through the chart we can quantify both the number of  disciplines contributing to integration points 
and also the volume or amount of  their contribution. This approach may help evaluate the breadth 
and/or depth of  the interdisciplinarity, depending on how those constructs are measured (Kelly, 
1996).  
Figure 2 also showcases clues about conversational roles other studies have shown are important for 
interdisciplinary communication: dominators (Bondy, 2010; Reed, 2008), boundary spanners (Klein, 
2014a), and integration specialists (Bammer, 2013). Figure 2 shows the sociologist speaks most; he 
may be a controller or dominator in this exchange. The reconstruction can help us interpret the na-
ture of  his control. Figure 2 also shows the hydrologist is the most flexible thinker as she contributes 
to all perspectives in the exchange; she acts as the boundary spanner with interactional expertise 
(Collins & Evans, 2002). The engineer may be the integration specialist as nearly one-third of  his 
words fall into a general perspective that applies to all parts of  the argument, except P3. Indeed, 
most of  the engineer’s words contribute to P5, which is the final premise needed to tie all the others 
together in a coherent, cogent conclusion. Thus, we see Figure 2 not only identifies sources and sites 
integration, it also aids the quick, visual identification of  key conversational roles that can spark fur-
ther analysis or team interventions. Together, the parallel sets chart and argument reconstruction 
provide a quantitative and qualitative understanding of  the nature of  interdisciplinary integration in 
this discourse. The new definition of  CIR proposed above makes these analyses possible. 
FROM DISRUPTION TO CONCLUSION TO ACTION 
The above dialogue excerpt is an example of  what Habermas (1985) calls “explicative discourse,” 
which is discourse about the standards for discourse, as noted above. Habermas explains,  
Explicative discourse [emphasis original] is a form of  argumentation in which the comprehensibility, 
well-formedness, or rule-correctness of  symbolic expressions is no longer naively supposed or 
contested but is thematized as a controversial claim. (p. 23) 
“Thematized” means abstracted from specifics into a principle that can be interrogated. In this case, 
specific instances of  purportedly “well-formed” definitions of  modeling are abstracted into a general 
definition of  modeling for their project. Another way of  describing this form of  discourse is a shift 
to a ‘meta-level’—from the current topic to how we ought to talk about the topic. The team is not trying to 
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model right now; they are talking about how to model within their project. This shift to explicative 
discourse is triggered because they keep using the term in different ways, disrupting their shared un-
derstanding of  modeling in their project. The sociologist opens this discussion by noticing this dis-
ruption and bringing it to the group, shifting discourse from a naïve supposition to a controversial 
claim. As a result, they want to know what counts as a good reason to trust each other’s modeling 
approaches. Explicative discourse, like any other discourse, becomes interdisciplinary when these 
standards for ‘good reasons’ are created or revised through the integration of  disciplinary contribu-
tions. As the example illustrates, choosing a team modeling approach is a common example of  inter-
disciplinary explicative discourse, and therefore is also an instance of  CIR. 
Now that they have an intersubjective standard for what counts as modeling, they can go on with 
modeling; their practice will require co-applying this standard in other kinds of  discourse. For exam-
ple, they might try to get at the truth of  something, and therefore apply this standard of  modeling in 
a future theoretical discourse. They might ask, “What could be the impact of  residential water use on 
this aquifer?” Collaborative consideration of  this question will be another instance of  CIR, but it is 
also the action-outcome of  the first instance. Their first instance of  CIR established what modeling 
is. This step will enable them to take the action of  modeling the aquifer, which will be the second 
instance of  CIR. In short, since actions count as non-linguistic expressions, the outcome of  one dis-
course is another discourse, and so on. Humans are in ongoing conversation with each other, and 
interdisciplinary research is no exception. 
COLLABORATIVE, INTERDISCIPLINARY REASONING QUALIFIED 
Of  course, to introduce the concept of  CIR I chose an example that successfully reached an inte-
grated, logical conclusion (in only 6 minutes of  conversation!). Its brevity might lead one to believe 
CIR is easy. It is not. Toolbox transcripts also contain muddled, confused arguments that never re-
solve. Dialogical impasses can be caused by many factors, including: the illusion of  agreement; the 
illusion of  disagreement; fuzzy concepts; information overload; implicit (or explicit) bias; competing 
values; moral dilemmas; incommensurable epistemologies and ontologies; and, almost inevitably, the 
jerk in the room. Freeing these impasses requires first diagnosing which factor—among others—is 
the root cause. Thinking in terms of  CIR can help with this diagnosis. By tracking which disciplinary 
standards are being integrated into an argument and how, a theorist or practitioner will find the point 
of  impasse. Several tracking questions aid this process: Does everyone agree on the type of  discourse 
we’re having right now (e.g., explicative, practical)? If  so, which reasons nevertheless fell flat? Who 
disagreed or got confused? Gently digging into the sticking point like a surgeon examining a wound 
will reveal the root causes. At bottom may be a difference in meanings, values, goals, or personalities 
that can be resolved. One must continue querying reasons for the impasse and considering answers 
from many perspectives. The solution to problems with CIR is often more CIR, increasingly targeted 
where there is lack of  intersubjectivity.  
However, sometimes more reasoning isn’t the solution. For instance, it is not clear that reasoning 
alone would be enough to involve the other nine participants in the exchange analyzed above. Per-
haps some did not speak due to testimonial quieting or smothering by more powerful members 
(Dotson, 2011). If so, more CIR would simply perpetuate this harm, making things worse. Perhaps 
some did not agree with the assumed standard of assertibility (“whatever we’ve experienced is assert-
ible.”) This may be a deep disagreement that is unresolvable; no matter what is said the disagreement 
would remain and participation would be divided. Although it was successful, the excerpt above is 
not perfectly ideal; intersubjectivity only extended to one-fourth of the group members. 
While a lot of  CIR isn’t as quickly resolved as the example I analyzed above, unresolved attempts at 
CIR are not complete failures. In the process of  genuinely engaging one another’s disciplinary stand-
ards, we learn a lot that will help us down the road—so long as we keep an open mind. We learn in-
tellectual humility, charity, and patience (Ferkany & Whyte, 2011). We learn new vocabulary words 
(Jeffrey, 2003). We learn who is motivated by what (Boix Mansilla, Lamont, & Sato, 2015). We learn 
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how to midwife half-formed ideas (Burnyeat, 1977; Plato, 369 BCE/1997, 148e-151d). By building 
these and other capacities (Salazar, Lant, Fiore, & Salas, 2012), we may eventually be able to integrate 
our reasons into a shared assertion. But perhaps, more importantly, we become better people along 
the way. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that CIR entails integration of  disciplinary contributions to co-apply, co-
revise, or co-create intersubjective standards for what counts as ‘good’ reasons and inferences in a 
team research project. The extended example illustrates this definition. Disciplinary integration is the 
intended consequence of  people from different disciplines trying to reason together. As Habermas, 
Wright, and Campolo conceive of  it, reasoning together requires intersubjective standards for evalu-
ating claims. These intersubjective standards constitute standards for reasonableness in the dialogue, 
whether talking about reasonable standards of  modeling, evidence, methodological adequacy, advo-
cacy, or figure design—to name a few areas of  possible conflict in research teams. Achieving such 
intersubjectivity requires teammates to integrate their respective standards for epistemic (e.g., truth, 
justification) and non-epistemic success (e.g., justice, feasibility) as well as the meaning of  shared 
concepts, because these standards and meanings often vary in different disciplines. That is, CIR is 
sensitive not only to the purpose of  the dialogue but also to the epistemic cultures of  the interlocu-
tors. Engineers, for example, employ different standards of  reasonableness and meaning than sociol-
ogists.  
To conclude, CIR is a unique instance of  reasoning together that has heretofore been under-
theorized by both argumentation theorists and scholars of  interdisciplinarity. While all instances of  
reasoning together depend upon intersubjectivity, as shown above CIR co-applies, co-revises, or co-
creates that intersubjectivity by integrating disciplinary contributions. Identifying the reasoning moves with-
in communicative actions facilitates intersubjectivity, enabling both theorists and practitioners to 
more effectively diagnose dialogical impasses and analyze the structure of  interdisciplinary infer-
ences. CIR is the engine of  knowledge integration in interdisciplinary teams, but it doesn’t always 
work well. Nonetheless, if  we can better understand the mechanism, we can better understand and 
improve the transformation of  disciplinary contributions into interdisciplinary insights. 
Furthermore, understanding CIR could also foster better understanding of  transdisciplinary reason-
ing. Widely regarded as a transformative form of  interdisciplinarity (Klein, 2014b), transdisciplinarity 
is compatible with the definition of  CIR above, leading to an expanded definition of  CTR integra-
tion in which disciplinary contributions result in a new paradigm—a novel kind of  standard for ex-
changing and evaluating reasons. Given this novelty, we can perhaps view CTR as creative while CIR 
as re-creative. Both types of  collaborative reasoning rely upon the ability of  participants to assess the 
cogency of  claims being made in dialogue and to assert a conclusion with one voice. 
At the same time, if  transdisciplinarity is understood as collaboration between academics and non-
academics (Klein, 2014b), speaking in unison and in academic discourse is not necessary. Shared 
standards of  reasoning then include different professional and cultural forms of  knowledge. Inputs 
to Figure 1 for this form of  CTR will differ from those in transformative CTR or in CIR. The pro-
cess may also differ if  integrated, univocal conclusions are not the goal. If  multivocality is an im-
portant end (Suthers, Lund, Rosé, Teplovs, & Law, 2013), the only standard of  reasoning everyone 
must adopt may be “Each to their own.” This sort of  reasoning together may be sufficient for some 
kinds of  coordinated action, such as university and private entities sharing space in the same building. 
More work remains to thicken the construct of  CIR by relating it to other “cognitive” or “learning” 
type constructs in interdisciplinarity literature (Boix Mansilla, 2010; Boix Mansilla et al., 2015; Derry 
et al., 2013; Nikitina, 2005), as well as more specific types of  argumentation from the argumentation 
and reasoning literatures (Juthe, 2015; van Eemeren, Garssen, Krabbe, Snoeck Henkemans, et al., 
2014b; Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008). Future research should then articulate what it means to do 
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CIR well or poorly. Recent work on the role of  values in setting scientific standards will be helpful 
here (e.g., Douglas, 2009; Elliott, 2017; Winsberg, Huebner, & Kukla, 2014), along with work on ep-
istemic harm (e.g., Dotson, 2012; Fricker, 2007) and ignorance (e.g., Ortega, 2006; Piso et al., 2016; 
Tuana, 2006). From here, we will be able to evaluate instances of  CIR and identify areas for im-
provement. These areas for improvement can then be matched to new or existing team science tools. 
From the other direction, we can understand why certain tools are or are not effective by examining 
how they enable or inhibit good CIR. All of  these research efforts will benefit from the sort of  close 
conversation analysis of  real team discourses exemplified in this paper (Choi & Richards, 2017). In 
summary, developing the theory and analysis of  collaborative, interdisciplinary reasoning is a neces-
sary step in realizing the promise of  interdisciplinary research. 
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